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eBay, Permanent Injunctions, and
Trade Secrets
Elizabeth A. Rowe*
Abstract
This Article presents the first qualitative empirical review
of permanent injunctions in trade secret cases. In addition, it
explores the extent to which the Supreme Court’s patent
decision in eBay v. MercExchange has influenced the analysis
of equitable principles in federal trade secret litigation. Among
the more notable findings are that while equitable principles
are generally applied in determining whether to grant a
permanent injunction to a prevailing party after trial, the
courts are not necessarily strictly applying the four factors from
eBay. The award of monetary relief does not preclude equitable
injunctive relief, and courts can find irreparable harm even
where the loss has been compensated monetarily. Moreover,
where injunctions are requested but denied, the lack of
irreparable harm seemed to have been the factor most often
articulated as the reason for the denial.
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I. Introduction
In 2017, I published the first empirical study of trade
secret damages in federal courts (initial study).1 Among its
many ground-breaking findings was that plaintiff trade secret
owners who take their cases to trial are very likely to win.2
1. See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages,
55 HOUS. L. REV. 155 (2017) (using a dataset derived from fifteen years of
federal court case law from 2000–2014 to analyze damages awarded in trade
secret claims).
2. See id. at 182 (“[T]he study shows that plaintiffs received a
favorable verdict 66% of the time, whereas for defendants, it was less than
half that number at 25%.”).
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Moreover, the initial study found that those cases where
permanent injunctions were awarded were also highly
positively correlated with the receipt of monetary damages.3
Indeed, “[d]amages on a trade secret claim [were] accompanied
by a permanent injunction about 80% of the time.”4 This
suggests that a trade secret owner who prevails on damages is
very likely to also receive a permanent injunction;5 a
particularly interesting finding, considering that permanent
injunctive relief for trade secret cases is essentially intended
as an alternative to damages.6
Following up on the initial study, this Article performs the
first qualitative empirical review of permanent injunctions in
federal courts and seeks to explore several questions. For
instance, was there a qualitative difference between those
cases where an injunction issued and those where it was
denied? What was the nature of the overlap between
permanent injunctions and damages? In theory, courts ought
to be granting permanent injunctions when a trade secret
owner is unable to be made whole from monetary relief, it has
suffered irreparable harm, and the injunction is limited in
length.7 However, is this consistent with what actually appears
to be happening “on the ground” at the trial courts and the
appeals courts? Finally, in deciding whether to enter a
permanent injunction, are the courts applying general
equitable principles, or specific factors from the Supreme
Court’s highly significant patent case eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.?8
In eBay the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the
“general rule” that a prevailing patentee is entitled to an

3. See id. at 195 (noting that a permanent injunction issued without
damages occurred in only nineteen percent of cases).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 196.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1985) (indicating that an injunction should last only as long as there is
actual or threatened misappropriation).
8. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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injunction.9 According to the eBay Court, whether a patentee
receives an injunction depends on a case-by-case analysis of
four traditional factors: (1) whether the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable injury if the infringement continued; (2) whether
the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of
the hardships imposed by granting or denying the injunction;
and (4) the public interest.10 Since the Supreme Court’s
decision in eBay, there seems to have been a shift from a
property rule to a liability rule when courts consider the grant
of permanent injunctions in patent cases.11 In practice, this
means that a patent owner does not automatically receive an
injunction upon winning an infringement case and does not
have an automatic right to exclude from its property, even
when liability is found.12
Although eBay was issued in a patent dispute, courts have
applied this principle to all other areas of intellectual property
over the past decade.13 However, there is concern about
whether they are consistently applying it in an appropriate
way.14 As Professor Lemley has argued in the trademark
context, for example, eBay merely suggests that equitable rules
should apply on a case-by-case basis, but it does not call for a
rigid and mandatory application of the four factors.15
Relatedly, once a plaintiff in a trade secret case proves
9. See id. at 393–94 (determining that the “decision whether to grant
or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district
courts”).
10. Id. at 391.
11. See Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent
Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1958
(2016) (arguing that eBay represents a shift from a traditional property rule
approach to patents to a liability approach).
12. See Robert I. Reis, Rights and Remedies Post eBay v.
MercExchange—Deep Waters Stirred, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 133, 145
(2008) (“There is no ‘absolute right to exclude’ as recognized by the eBay
court.”).
13. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Did eBay Irreparably Injure Trademark
Law?, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1795, 1798 (2017) (noting that some circuits
have applied eBay’s reasoning to copyright cases in addition to patent cases).
14. See id. at 1796 (“[T]rademark courts have misinterpreted eBay,
treating each of the four factors as a requirement rather than a
consideration.”).
15. See id. at 1800 (noting that eBay was intended to create a
case-by-case inquiry based on the contextual need for an injunction).
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misappropriation, it may argue that it is “automatically”
entitled to permanent injunctive relief.16 In such
circumstances, are the courts taking a perfunctory approach,
or are they carefully and methodically applying equitable
principles in trade secret litigation? Consequently, in
conjunction with its empirical inquiry, this Article also
explores the influence of eBay in trade secret litigation by
reviewing published cases. In so doing, it seeks to ascertain,
for instance, whether the eBay trends in trade secret litigation
mirror those from patent litigation, and whether the
traditional presumption of irreparable harm in trade secrecy
has been affected by eBay.17
The qualitative analysis in this follow-up study consisted
of reviewing the dockets and relevant case files in the federal
district court cases from the initial study.18 Among the more
notable findings were that while equitable principles are
generally applied in determining whether to grant a
permanent injunction to a prevailing party after trial, the
courts are not necessarily strictly applying the four factors
from eBay.19 The award of monetary relief does not preclude
equitable injunctive relief, and courts can find irreparable
harm even where the loss has been compensated monetarily.20
Moreover, where injunctions are requested but denied, the lack
of irreparable harm seemed to have been the factor most often
articulated as the reason for the denial.21
Given the recent enactment of the federal Defend Trade
Secrets Act (DTSA)22 and the attendant influx of trade secret

16. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (“Actual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined.”).
17. See generally Ronald T. Coleman Jr. et al., Applicability of the
Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE L.J. 3 (2012)
(discussing eBay’s effect on other types intellectual property litigation).
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. See infra Part II.B.2.
22. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat.
376 (2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2018)).
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cases in federal courts23 (that now have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction),24 this Article is especially timely and
significant for its unique contribution in combining an
investigation of the influence of eBay in trade secret litigation
with an empirical review of trade secret permanent injunctions
in federal district courts. It further augments the scant
empirical work in trade secrecy generally.25 Beyond adding
depth to the trade secret literature on remedies, the insights
from this undertaking will also prove beneficial to scholars,
trade secret litigants, and the courts.
The Article begins in Part II by providing background
information about permanent injunctive relief in trade secret
cases.26 It then presents a review of the extent to which federal
courts have been applying eBay in trade secret cases, and the
prominent role that one factor, irreparable harm, appears to
play when applying the equitable principles to decisions about
granting injunctive relief.27 Part III reviews the methodology
and data collection from the initial study, and its connection to
this follow-up qualitative review of the cases.28 The results
from the qualitative study are presented in Part IV, beginning
with observations about the nature of the injunction orders,
scope of the orders, effect of monetary relief and punitive
damages, the approach in cases that involved both patent and
trade secret claims, and the relative absence of discussion
about ongoing use of trade secrets by the parties (compared to
the non-practicing entities in patent cases).29 Next, with
respect to those cases where permanent injunctions were not
entered (but damages were received), the section posits that
most of the time either a request for an injunction was not
23. See Michael Risch, Empirical Methods in Trade Secret Research, in
2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
12– 13, https://perma.cc/3QAU-NCER (PDF) (discussing the availability of
federal jurisdiction for trade secrets cases).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (2018) (granting federal district courts
jurisdiction over misappropriation of trade secrets).
25. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1951 (noting the lack of empirical
studies on eBay’s effect in patent litigation).
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
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made, or when it was made, it was denied for lack of
irreparable harm.30 Thus, consistent with the published cases,
irreparable harm stood out as the most prominent of the
equitable factors among the cases in the study.31 Finally, the
Article concludes that this study yielded interesting and novel
insights and discusses the value of these insights to litigants
and the courts as more and more trade secret cases move into
the federal courts.32
II. Background on Trade Secret Permanent Injunctions
Throughout the period covered by the initial study (2000
to 2014), trade secret damages were governed by state law.33
Thus, most civil trade secret claims were filed in state courts. 34
However, trade secret cases could be filed in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction if the amount in controversy
exceeded $75,000.35 Cases could also be removed by the
defendant from state to federal court if there is a federal claim
(such as a patent infringement claim) to which the state claim
is supplemental.36 Indeed, in this study twenty-two percent of
the cases were initially filed in state court and were later
removed to federal court.37 Cases filed in federal court would
generally apply the trade secret law of the state in which the

30. See infra Part IV.B.
31. See infra Part IV.C.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 156–57 (explaining that prior to the
enactment of DTSA “the development of civil trade secret law in the United
States . . . occurred exclusively under state law and largely in state courts”).
34. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 70 (2010) (noting that state
court was often the only venue available for trade secrets litigation).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018) (delineating diversity jurisdiction
requirements).
36. See id. §§ 1331, 1367 (providing requirements for federal question
and supplemental jurisdiction, respectively); see also id. § 1446 (providing
procedural requirements for removal).
37. Rowe, supra note 1, at 160.
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court is located, unless choice of law principles require
otherwise for that particular case.38
Since most of the states have adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (UTSA), usually the trade secret law applied would
be that from the UTSA.39 Therefore, this Article will make
reference to the remedies and damages provided under the
UTSA and will note where significant exceptions may have
been carved out in particular states.40 “Because it was often
difficult for trade secret plaintiffs to prove actual damages, the
remedies provision of the UTSA attempted to help solve the
problem by specifying the types of available remedies, and the
conditions under which they will be granted.”41
Even though the DTSA is in effect, its development is just
beginning, and it does not preempt the long existing and rich
state laws that form the trade secret jurisprudence in this
country.42 Indeed, the DTSA is modeled after, and will
continue to be heavily influenced by, the interpretations of the
UTSA, which has been adopted by almost all the states.43
Accordingly, trade secret law continues to require an
understanding of the UTSA and the common law of trade
secrets.44
There are two general types of injunctive relief.
Preliminary injunctions are issued in the early stages, before a
trial on the merits, in order to preserve the status quo from
38. See Almeling, supra note 34, at 75 (discussing pre-DTSA choice of
law issues in state court trade secret litigation).
39. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 160 (noting most states have adopted the
UTSA).
40. In jurisdictions that have not adopted the UTSA—namely New
York—available remedies have been developed for trade secret
misappropriation. See, e.g., E.J. Brooks Co. v. Cambridge Sec. Seals, 105
N.E.3d 301, 316 (N.Y. 2018) (providing common law misappropriation
remedies such as injunctions as well as compensatory and punitive
damages). The common law or state statutes must be examined in the states
to determine the scope of damages.
41. Rowe, supra note 1, at 160; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2–5
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended 1985) (listing available remedies).
42. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 160 (stating the DTSA does not preempt
state law); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1836(f) (2018) (describing the civil
proceedings available for misappropriation of trade secrets).
43. Rowe, supra note 1, at 160.
44. Id.
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before the alleged misappropriation.45 Permanent injunctions
are issued after a trial on the merits when the trade secret
owner has prevailed on its claim.46 It is the latter type of
injunction that is the focus of this Article.
After a decision on the merits has been reached in a trade
secret case, a court may enter a permanent injunction.47
Permanent injunctive relief is generally an available remedy
when a plaintiff in a trade secret case cannot show monetary
harm.48 “In the absence of provable monetary damages (and
often in addition thereto), the principal remedy [for trade
secret misappropriation] is likely to be permanent injunctive
relief.”49 According to both the UTSA and the DTSA, such
relief may be granted to enjoin actual or threatened trade
secret misappropriation “on such terms as the court deems
reasonable,” including with respect to the length of the
injunction.50
The UTSA limits the length of permanent injunctive relief
to the time period during which the subject information

45. See GoTo.Com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th
Cir. 2000) (defining the “status quo” in the context of granting a preliminary
injunction in a trademark infringement case as “refer[ring] not simply to any
situation before the filing of the lawsuit, but instead to ‘the last uncontested
status which preceded the pending controversy’” (quoting Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963))).
46. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12
(1987) (explaining that a preliminary injunction “is essentially the same as a
permanent injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a
likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success”).
47. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F.
Supp. 2d 691, 706 (E.D. Va. 2012), vacated and remanded, 564 F. App’x 710
(4th Cir. 2014) (interpreting the UTSA, as adopted by the state of Virginia,
as allowing the court to enter an injunction).
48. See SHARON K. SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW
IN A NUTSHELL § 6.4 (West 2d ed. 2018) (discussing requirements for
permanent injunctive relief).
49. Id.
50. Id.; Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153,
§ 2(b)(3)(A)(i), 130 Stat. 376, 381 (2016) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (2018)); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N, amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
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remains a trade secret.51 Typically, the length of a permanent
injunction depends on the facts of the case, and courts will
often consider the commercial advantage that a defendant
might have gained from misappropriating the trade secret.52
Once a plaintiff in a trade secret case proves
misappropriation, particularly in a UTSA jurisdiction or in a
DTSA case, it may argue that it is “automatically” entitled to
injunctive relief because such relief is a statutorily prescribed
remedy.53 Whether this argument will work depends upon the
law of the applicable state and how the federal courts interpret
and apply the DTSA.54 There is nothing in the language of the
UTSA or DTSA that specifically requires courts to apply
“principles of equity,” as was the case with patent law in the
eBay case.55 However, consistent with the common law origins
of trade secret law, the grant of permanent injunctive relief is
ordinarily subject to principles of equity.56 Applicable law and
the facts of each case will dictate the equitable factors on
which courts focus when deciding whether to grant permanent
injunctive relief.57
Although a request for injunctive relief is central to many
trade secret cases, plaintiffs who successfully prove that their
trade secrets have been wrongly used or disclosed (as opposed
51. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §2(a) cmt. (“The general principle of
Section 2(a) and (b) is that an injunction should last for as long as is
necessary, but no longer than is necessary, to eliminate the commercial
advantage or ‘lead time’ with respect to good faith competitors that a person
has obtained through misappropriation.”).
52. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sung, 843 F. Supp. 776, 780 (D. Mass.
1994) (determining the length of an injunction based on the time it would
have taken the defendant to independently develop the relevant technology).
53. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 699, 706 (discussing the
availability of injunctive relief).
54. See id. (“It is instructive to note that, in cases decided after eBay,
several courts have applied state substantive law to determine whether a
permanent injunction should issue.”).
55. SANDEEN & ROWE, supra note 48, at § 6.4.1; eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
56. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 698–700, 701, 706, 710,
716– 17 (“[I]t lies within the equity power of the court to command
[defendant] to cease or perform acts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.”).
57. See id. at 710 (reviewing the facts courts consider when determining
the scope of an injunction).

EBAY, PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS, AND TRADE SECRETS

563

to merely acquired) can also seek an award of monetary
relief.58 The UTSA provides that “actual loss caused by
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment that is caused by
misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
actual loss” can all be included as a measure for trade secret
damages.59 Accordingly, the trade secret plaintiff may recover
both actual losses and the “unjust benefit” caused by the
defendant.60 While compensatory damages can be combined
with injunctive relief, the UTSA cautions that “injunctive relief
will ordinarily preclude a monetary award for a period in
which the injunction is effective.”61
A. The UTSA and Injunctive Relief
Section 2(a) of the UTSA provides:
Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.
Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be
terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but
the injunction may be continued for an additional
reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial
advantage that otherwise would be derived from the
misappropriation.62

Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances a court may
issue an injunction that conditions future use of the trade
secret on payment of a reasonable royalty.63 In addition, a
court may also compel affirmative acts, such as requiring the
defendant to hand the trade secrets over to the owner.64
In terms of duration, the language of Section 2(a)
authorizes the party enjoined to apply to terminate an
injunction when the trade secret ceases to exist.65 When the
trade secret continues to exist, however, the UTSA does not
58. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (describing the circumstances in
which money damages are appropriate for misappropriation).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 3 cmt.
61. Id.
62. Id. § 2(a).
63. Id. § 2(b).
64. Id. § 2(c).
65. Id. § 2(a).
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provide for a specific duration.66 There is, however, a stated
preference for courts to express duration.67 Courts tend to
require a showing of irreparable harm (even though this does
not appear directly in the language of Section 2(a)) based on
general equitable principles.68 Some courts presume
irreparable harm when a trade secret has been
misappropriated,69 while others require that the trade secret
owner have affirmative evidence of irreparable harm.70 When a
fact finder has found liability and misappropriation has been
proven at trial, a court may be willing to presume that
continued misappropriation will cause irreparable harm.71
The scope of injunctions vary based on fact-specific
circumstances.72 They could be mandatory (as, for example,
mandating that any misappropriated trade secrets be
returned) and/or prohibitory (such as barring the use or

66. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., Permanent Injunctive Relief for Trade
Secret Misappropriation Without an Express Limit Upon Its Duration, 17
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173, 196 (2011) (“With respect to information that
remains secret, the Uniform Act does not directly address the duration of
injunctive relief.”).
67. See id. at 196–98 (noting the UTSA “explicitly authorizes a
defendant to apply to an issuing court to terminate an unlimited
injunction”).
68. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268,
273–74 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“[When] the applicable statute provides for
injunctive relief but does not contain the statutory guidelines . . . [t]he
standards therefore revert to the normal equity rules.”); Bishop & Co. v.
Cuomo, 799 P.2d 444, 445–47 (Colo. App. 1990) (requiring a showing of
irreparable harm pursuant to Colorado civil procedure rules for trade secret
claims).
69. See FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63
(2d Cir. 1984) (finding irreparable harm because “[a] trade secret once lost is,
of course, lost forever”).
70. See Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118
(2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting the proposition that a “presumption of irreparable
harm automatically arises upon the determination a trade secret has been
misappropriated”).
71. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 7.03(1)(a) (Law Journal Press
2010) (1997) (“[O]nce the misappropriation has been proved there is a
tendency to presume that future harm will be irreparable.”).
72. This study did not record the terms of the injunctive relief, but it
could be an interesting follow-up for further study.
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disclosure of the secret).73 Prohibitory injunctions could
themselves range from simple to complex based on the extent
to which they restrict the other party.74 Some may merely
prohibit any disclosure of the trade secret, while others may
restrict use of the trade secret in such a way that it impedes
manufacturing or production of the infringing product.75 For
example, in Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel L.L.C.,76 Lionel
was permanently enjoined from using Mike’s Train House’s
existing design drawings to manufacture the specific toy trains
they had copied and from producing more wax molds utilizing
the stolen drawings.77 In the more stringent circumstances,
injunctions could be seen as anticompetitive.78
B. eBay in Published Trade Secret Cases
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, there seems
to have been a shift from a property rule to a liability rule
when courts consider the grant of permanent injunctions in
patent cases.79 This has crept into other areas of intellectual
property, even though eBay was a patent case.80 This means
that an intellectual property owner does not have an automatic
73. See ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, TRADE SECRECY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 116 (2015) (stating permanent injunctive relief
must not be overly broad due to the nature of trade secret injunctions).
74. See id. (comparing “use injunctions” to injunctions that “prevent the
defendant from enjoying the fruits of the misappropriated trade secrets”).
75. See id. (discussing the varying forms of permanent injunctive relief).
76. No. 00-71729, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22680 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1,
2004), rev’d and remanded, 472 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2006).
77. Id. at *3–4.
78. See Parrish v. Latham & Watkins, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388, 399 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2015), aff’d, 400 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015) (addressing whether the
underlying misappropriation of trade secrets action constituted a malicious
prosecution).
79. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1958 (proposing theoretical literature
favors the property rule approach while eBay signifies a shift away from this
approach); Ryan T. Holte, Clarity in Remedies for Patent Cases, 26 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 127, 157–58 (2018) (suggesting eBay sparked a debate over
whether the property rule approach verses the liability rule approach
governs enforcement of intellectual property holders’ rights).
80. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 13, at 1798 (stating several courts have
applied eBay to copyright cases).
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right to exclude from its property, even when liability is
found.81 Rather, the courts are urged to evaluate each case
based on principles of equity (or the eBay four factors) to
decide whether a permanent injunction is warranted.82 In the
trade secret cases, perhaps that shift has not yet occurred as
abruptly given that winners tend to receive permanent
injunctions,83 and there does not appear to be much reasoning
in the permanent injunction orders.84 More broadly, though, it
might be worth considering whether patent and trade secret
cases should be treated equally with respect to permanent
injunctive relief. Thus, should the type of intellectual property
at issue, or its potential for misuse, influence the standard for
awarding a permanent injunction?
There is also the issue of whether eBay is applicable at all
in trade secret cases, particularly when the claims are based
on state law under the UTSA85 and not the more recently
enacted federal DTSA. Since the decision of whether to grant
an injunction is substantive, per the Erie doctrine86 state law
should be applied.87 Thus, in most trade secret cases, courts
should apply state substantive law to decide whether to grant
a permanent injunction without the need to apply the eBay

81. Reis, supra note 12, at 145.
82. See id. (proposing analysis similar to eBay “by identifying specific
incidents of rights within the classification trade secret, whether property or
not”).
83. Rowe, supra note 1, at 195.
84. See infra Part III.A.1.
85. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://perma.cc
/LK7D-RLGH (last visited Feb. 9, 2020) (noting that the UTSA has been
effectively adopted by all states except New York) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See generally Michael S. Green, The Erie Doctrine: A Flowchart, 52
AKRON L. REV. 215 (discussing the Erie doctrine and related issues).
87. See 13 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.07(2) (2019)
Under the Erie doctrine, the federal courts must apply the
substantive law of the forum state in diversity of citizenship
actions. Because the nature of the relief awarded is so obviously
intertwined with the substantive law being enforced, the Rules of
Decision Act requires that state law controls such issues. Thus, in
assessing the merits of a request for injunctive relief in a diversity
of citizenship action, federal courts generally will apply state law.
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factors.88 Indeed, an opinion stemming from one of the cases in
the initial study held that eBay only applied to federal statutes
and not cases under the UTSA.89
Many federal appeals cases directly rely on the four
factors stated in eBay when assessing permanent injunctions
in trade secret misappropriation cases.90 These factors include
(1) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm
unless the injunction is granted; (2) whether legal remedies
will not adequately compensate for that harm; (3) whether the
balance of hardships imposed by granting or denying the
injunction would favor the moving party; and (4) whether
issuance of the injunction will not adversely affect the public
interest.91 In most instances, even if the cases do not directly
rely on eBay, the courts generally consider general equitable
principles.92 A district court in Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v.
Sycamore93 used similar factors to determine whether a
permanent injunction should be granted: (1) actual success on
the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is
issued; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the
injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the
injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public

88. See Deer Valley Resort Co. v. Christy Sports, LLC, No.
2:07-cv-904-CW, 2010 WL 1065940, at *4 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2010) (stating
the parties agreed the court should apply state substantive law for the
permanent injunction issue); Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie
and the Standards for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L.
REV. 457, 458 (2018) (explaining persuasively why federal courts should
apply states’ equitable principles for claims arising under state law); Camilla
A. Hrdy, Erie, Remedies, and Trade Secrets, 10 CONLAWNOW 237
(2018–2019) (arguing that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply
court administration standards from the forum state court).
89. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F. Supp. 2d
691, 706 (E.D. Va. 2012), vacated and remanded, 564 F. App’x 710 (4th Cir.
2014) (stating that applying eBay to the Virginia UTSA would violate Erie).
90. See infra Part II.B.1.
91. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
92. See ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 73, at 115 (stating the UTSA’s
language “gives courts discretion to grant injunctive relief and, thus, to
consider the equities of each case”).
93. No. 2:13-cv-00749-DN-DBP, 2018 WL 1578115 (D. Utah Mar. 29,
2018).
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interest.94 In this case, since those factors were met, the court
entered the permanent injunction.95 Some courts consider
fewer than four factors in conducting their analysis, such as
adequacy of the legal remedy and irreparable harm96 or
balance of the hardships and the public interest.97
As a supplement to reviewing the district court cases in
the study, I also conducted a review of published federal cases
to gauge the extent to which courts appear to be applying eBay
to trade secret cases, and which of the four equitable
considerations seemed to play a larger role in the injunction
analysis. As an intial matter, note that state courts seem to
rarely apply eBay when the state’s version of the UTSA
provides for injunctions as a form of relief.98
1. Are Federal Courts Applying eBay to Trade Secret Cases?
With respect to trade secret cases in the federal courts,
there were a variety of approaches. Some circuits used the
eBay factors to determine whether a permanent injunction is
proper even if the state’s UTSA allows for permanent
injunctions.99 For instance, the Second Circuit recognizes that
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. at *5–6.
96. See, e.g., Tradesman Intern., Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th
Cir. 2013) (stating the rule under Ohio law); ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 753 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding the plaintiff did not
have an adequate remedy at law based on monetary awards alone because
the defendant’s continued possession of the trade secret would irreparably
harm the plaintiff).
97. See, e.g., E.I. Dupont, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 707 (stating the rule under
Virginia law); AutoPartSource, LLC v. Bruton, No. 3:13CV54-HEH, 2013 WL
3766524, at *12 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2013) (“Because VUTSA explicitly
provides for injunctive relief, [the plaintiff] is not required to demonstrate
irreparable harm or the lack of an adequate remedy at law.”).
98. See, e.g., Inner-Tite Corp. v. Brozowski, No. 20101056, 2010 WL
3038330, at *20–21 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2010) (applying eBay’s factor
test). Searches on both Lexis and Westlaw using a combination of search
terms including “permanent injunction,” “ebay,” “Mercexchange,” and “trade
secret” revealed only this one state trade secret case that cited eBay. In this
Massachusetts case, the court did not presume irreparable harm when
analyzing whether a permanent injunction is appropriate. Id. at *66–67.
99. See, e.g., CardiAQ Valve Techs. v. Neovasc Inc., No.
14-cv-12405-ADB, 2016 WL 6465411, at *667–68 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2016)
(finding no abuse of discretion when the trial court applied eBay in denying
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the eBay analysis can be used to determine whether a
permanent injunction is proper, but it does not automatically
use the eBay factors.100 The Third Circuit has case law
applying eBay.101 The Fourth Circuit uses the eBay analysis
but does not require a showing of irreparable harm or lack of
an adequate remedy as long as the court finds
misappropriation of trade secrets.102 The Tenth Circuit has its
the requested injunction); Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., No.
09-cv-451-JL, 2011 WL 6300622, at *25–28 (D.N.H. Dec. 16, 2011) (applying
eBay in stating the permanent injunction was appropriate in this case);
Hilton Worldwide, Inc. v. Global Advert., Inc., No. 1:15cv1001, 2016 WL
8223436, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2016) (applying eBay to a state cause of
action for misappropriation of trade secrets); Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F Mktg.
LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00228-FDW-DSC, 2013 WL 443698, at *22 (W.D.N.C. Feb.
5, 2013) (utilizing the test in eBay for a state statute providing the court with
discretion to grant or deny a permanent injunction); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata
Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 14-CV-748-WMC, 2016 WL 1696912, at *1
(W.D. Wis. Apr. 27, 2016) (applying eBay to balance equities for granting an
injunction for a state misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, No. 5:14-CV-5262, 2017 WL
3206942, at *1 (W.D. Ark. July 28, 2017) (using the factors in eBay to
determine whether to grant a permanent injunction for a state trade secrets
cause of action); Strikepoint Trading, LLC v. Sabolyk, No. SACV 07-1073
DOC (MLGx), 2009 WL 10659684, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009) (stating
the California trade secrets statute provides for injunctive relief and
applying the eBay four-factor test); Dai v. Freeman & Williams, LLP, No.
3:05-CV-00269-ECR (VPC), 2007 WL 9719167, at *3 (D. Nev. June 18, 2007)
(explaining the applicable statute provides for injunctive relief and citing
eBay in rejecting the claim that an injunction would be inappropriate as a
matter of law); WIT Wälchli Innovation Techs. v. Westrick, No.
12-CIV-20072, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7933, at *5–10 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24,
2012) (stating the applicable state statute provides for injunctive relief and
applying eBay as the permanent injunction standard).
100. See, e.g., Assa Abloy Sales & Mktg. Grp. v. Task, Fcz, No.
3:15-cv-00656 (JAM), 2018 WL 691711, at *7 n.5 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2018)
(reasoning that the court would reach the same conclusion if it had applied
eBay instead of state law in determining whether to grant a permanent
injunction).
101. See, e.g., AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, No. 13-5747, 2016
WL 792498, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2016) (adopting the eBay four-factor test
in deciding whether to grant permanent injunctive relief).
102. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F.
Supp. 2d 691, 706–07 (E.D. Va. 2012), vacated and remanded, 564 F. App’x
710 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating the Fourth Circuit does not treat eBay as
controlling but that the Virginia approach requires courts to consider certain
factors from eBay); Hilton Worldwide, 2016 WL 8223436, at *8 (stating the
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own set of factors that it uses to determine whether a
permanent injunction is appropriate.103
Berry v. Dillon,104 from the Ninth Circuit, analyzed
permanent injunctive relief under the four factor test from
eBay.105 Because the plaintiff was not able to show a threat of
continuing infringement and that monetary damages would
not be able to compensate for past injury, the court affirmed
the denial of the permanent injunction.106 In a Pennsylvania
district court case applying four factors under California
law,107 the court determined that an injunction will only be
granted if there is a substantial threat of impending harm,
which does not extend to mere possession by the
misappropriating party or previous misuse.108 In this case, the
court only determined there was a substantial threat of
impending harm and granted the permanent injunction.109
2. Irreparable Harm Plays a Big Role
Whether applying eBay or general equitable principles,
which factor seems most influential to the courts? Most of the
time it appears to be irreparable harm. In one case the
Seventh Circuit upheld denial of the permanent injunction
“loss of a trade secret also represents an irreparable harm”); Bridgetree, 2013
WL 443698, at *22 (“First, irreparable harm to Plaintiff is presumed because
a jury found Defendants to have misappropriated trade secrets.”); Uhlig LLC
v. Shirley, No. 6:08-cv-01208-JMC, 2012 WL 2458062, at *3 (D.S.C. June 27,
2012) (rejecting the presumption of irreparable harm for a case involving a
compilation of customer and market data, an atypical trade secret
misappropriation situation).
103. See, e.g., Skycam, LLC v. Bennett, No. 09-CV-294-GKF-FHM, 2012
WL 4483610, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 27, 2012) (requiring a party to prove
“(1) actual success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction
is issued; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the injunction
may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not
adversely affect the public interest”).
104. 291 F. App’x 792 (9th Cir. 2008).
105. See id. at 795–96 (opining the district court’s pre-eBay decision is
correct under the four-factor test set forth in eBay).
106. Id.
107. De Lage Landen Operational Servs., LLC v. Third Pillar Sys., Inc.,
693 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
108. Id. at 431.
109. Id. at 441.
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because the plaintiff was not able to establish irreparable
harm.110 This case analyzed permanent injunctive relief under
Ohio law and determined that a plaintiff needs to be able to
demonstrate both irreparable harm and lack of an adequate
legal remedy to be granted permanent injunctive relief. 111
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a
permanent injunction because there was no irreparable
harm.112 A district court case from Massachusetts applying
eBay found that monetary damages were adequate to
compensate for the injury, and both the public interest and
balance of the hardships disfavor the injunction and, thus, the
request was denied.113 In addition, the Tenth Circuit in
ClearOne Communications Inc. v. Bowers114 determined that
there was irreparable harm and the award of a permanent
injunction would be more beneficial than monetary damages.115
It thus affirmed the granting of the permanent injunction.116
An important question is whether irreparable harm
should be presumed in trade secret cases for the purposes of
granting a permanent injunction once there has been a finding
that trade secrets have been misappropriated. The traditional
view has been that irreparable harm should be presumed.117
However, more recently, and perhaps due to the influence of
eBay, some courts are not as willing to accept that

110. See Tradesman Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 724 F.3d 1004, 1007–15 (7th Cir.
2013) (asserting the plaintiff who chose not to seek preliminary injunctive
relief failed to show irreparable harm because the defendants complied with
“almost all of the reasonable terms of their [non-compete agreement]”).
111. See id. at 1012 (analyzing Ohio Supreme Court precedent).
112. See Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis Equip. & Mfg.,
Inc., 511 F. App’x 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying Ohio UTSA).
113. See generally CardiAQ Valve Techs. v. Neovasc Inc., No.
14-cv-12405-ADB, 2016 WL 6465411 (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2016).
114. 643 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2011).
115. Id. at 753–54.
116. See id. at 754 (finding no abuse of discretion).
117. See Allied Erecting, 511 F. App’x at 404–05 (observing that the
presumption of irreparable harm rests on the assumption that it is difficult
or impossible to measure monetary damages resulting from loss of a trade
secret).
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presumption as the default.118 In particular, and of relevance
to this Article, is the influence of monetary relief.119 To the
extent the presumption of irreparable harm is based on the
assumption that the loss of trade secrets is difficult to measure
in monetary terms, should a trade secret owner who has been
awarded monetary damages also be entitled to a permanent
injunction? Some courts find that where a jury has awarded
damages, a permanent injunction should not issue,120 while
others find the two are not mutually exclusive.121
The Federal Circuit in CardiAQ Valve Technologies, Inc. v.
Neovasc Inc.122 upheld the denial of a permanent injunction
because the requested injunction would have been duplicative
of the monetary relief received by the plaintiff.123 In coming to
this decision, the district court also considered the uncertainty
in the market, the impact the injunction would have on the
defendant, and “the public’s interest in having access to a
potentially life-saving technology.”124
In TMRJ Holdings, Inc. v. Inhance Technologies.,
L.L.C.,125 a court of appeals in Texas reviewed whether a trial
court erred in awarding both damages and permanent
injunctive relief.126 The defendant against whom the injunction
was entered argued that the two remedies were duplicative,
and that awarding both violated the one-satisfaction rule.127
The jury awarded “$4 million in reasonable-royalty damages
118. See, e.g., id. at 405 (finding that “[r]egardless of the merits of
generally presuming irreparable harm in trade-secrets litigation,” injunctive
relief was not warranted when plaintiff had been awarded unjust enrichment
damages and “did not request injunctive relief until after the jury rendered
its verdict”).
119. See infra Part IV.A.3.
120. See, e.g., Allied Erecting, 511 F. App’x at 405 (finding the jury award
of unjust enrichment damages adequate).
121. See infra Part III.A; see, e.g., ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers,
643 F.3d 735, 754 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding the district court did not
abuse its discretion by issuing a permanent injunction even where the jury
verdict included damages).
122. 708 F. App’x 654 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
123. Id. at 667–69.
124. Id. at 667.
125. 540 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. App. 2018).
126. Id. at 204–05.
127. Id. at 205.
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and $10,500 in lost profits” to the plaintiff.128 The trial court
entered judgment on those damages and also granted a
permanent injunction.129 In reviewing whether the reasonable
royalty damages overlapped with the permanent injunction
that prohibited future use of the trade secrets, the court
reasoned that the reasonable royalty damages did not make
the plaintiff whole.130 That is because the reasonable royalty
damages awarded by the jury “were not based on actual future
use of the trade secret” but were meant to compensate “purely
for the misappropriation of the technology.”131 The present
value of the technology was “based in part on potential for
future use, regardless of whether or not that use came to
fruition.”132 In addition, the court found that the evidence at
trial showed that the plaintiff “never intended the trade
secrets to be commercially available;” thus, they were never
intended to be licensed or otherwise used by a third party.133
Accordingly, a reasonable royalty would “not fully compensate
for misappropriation of a trade secret that the owner seeks to
preserve for its exclusive use and would not sell.”134 The court
further found that although the royalty determination
conceivably included future revenue that licensing the trade
secrets might have produced, “the trial court reasonably could
have concluded that this measure of actual damages did not
fully compensate [the plaintiff] absent an injunction because
[the plaintiff] never intended that the trade secrets be
available in the marketplace.”135

128. Id. at 204.
129. Id. at 208.
130. See id. at 210 (concluding both remedies together were necessary to
redress the plaintiff’s injury).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 211.
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III. Data Collection and Methodology

This Part explains the relevant data collection and
methodology for the initial study and this injunction analysis.
In order to provide appropriate context to the reader, a brief
summary of the techniques and methods used to locate, collect,
and code the original dataset is presented first.136 Next, the
connection between the initial study and this qualitative study
is introduced, along with the methodology for the evaluation of
the cases.137 In short, this study is a qualitative review of the
dockets and relevant case files from the district court cases
comprising the initial study.
A. Brief Summary of Data Collection for the Initial Study
Starting in 2015, a significant amount of time was spent
designing the initial study on trade secret damages, in part
because no single source contained all of the cases necessary
for building the data set and because of the thoughtful
deliberation regarding the selection of variables.138 For the
purpose of that study, a “trade secret case” was defined as “a
case containing either a trade secret claim or counterclaim.”139
The time period selected for examining verdicts and
judgements was January 1, 2000 through December 31,
2014.140 Therefore, the cases in the study were all decided
during this fifteen-year period.141 Ultimately, the bulk of cases
came from jury verdict reports available on Westlaw and Lexis.
The first points of review for receiving the information in
the coding process were the summary reports in Westlaw and
Lexis.142 From there, using the case docket number, additional
information was obtained and verified from the case

136. See infra Part III.A.
137. See infra Part III.B.
138. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 166–68 (describing the initial study’s
design).
139. Id. at 166.
140. Id. at 166–67.
141. See id. at 167 n.71 (“The end date of 2014 was selected because it
was the most recent year-end prior to the start coding.”).
142. Id. at 168.
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pleadings.143 For instance, jury verdict forms and final orders
of judgment were used to verify and complete the information
available in the summary reports.144 The Bloomberg docket
searching tool proved especially useful as a resource for
locating relevant case information.145 It also appeared to be the
most reliable source.146
I decided to focus on cases filed only in federal court, as
this appeared to be the most manageable and feasible process
for the initial study. Among other reasons, the state courts’
dockets were less standardized,147 more difficult to search for
the relevant variables, and would have required coding over a
thousand cases that initially appeared to fit the definition.148
Ultimately, there were a total of 157 usable cases149 included
in the data set.
B. Methodology for the Injunction Analysis
Among the findings in the initial study was that in twenty
percent of cases a permanent injunction was issued
post-trial.150 Moreover, those cases where permanent

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Docket Research, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR.,
https://perma.cc/PGN6-TAQ8 (last updated July 2, 2018) (last visited Jan. 9,
2020) (explaining that Bloomberg “includes full coverage of Federal Court
dockets (same data from PACER) and state court coverage”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. Rowe, supra note 1, at 168.
147. See Risch, supra note 23, at 12 (“[W]hen [state court dockets] are
available, they are not standardized even within a given state, let alone
between states.”).
148. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 167 n.73 (“An initial search of the
applicable databases for state and federal cases identified 1,244 potential
cases.”).
149. Id. at 167. Cases were filtered for duplicate entries and also for
cases that ultimately did not meet the definition of a trade secret case as
defined by the study (having a trade secret claim or counterclaim). Id. at 167
n.74. Some cases were also excluded because sufficient information was not
available in the public databases or because they were sealed. Id.
150. Id. at 195. Preliminary injunctions (pre-trial) were granted and
denied at virtually equal rates—twenty-four percent and twenty-three
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injunctions were granted were highly positively correlated
with the receipt of monetary damages.151 Damages on a trade
secret claim were accompanied by a permanent injunction
about eighty percent of the time.152 This is interesting
considering that permanent injunctive relief was intended to
be more of an alternative to damages than an add-on.153 It
suggested that a trade secret owner who prevails on damages
is likely to also receive a permanent injunction almost
automatically.154 Why is that? That is the question that this
qualitative study seeks to investigate.
This study therefore focuses on the grant or denial of
permanent injunctions in the cases from the initial study
where damages were awarded on the trade secret claims.155 I
was particularly interested in determining whether there were
any qualitative patterns that may affect the grant or denial of
a permanent injunction, such as the award of monetary
relief,156 as well as principles either generally or from eBay in
issuing or denying injunctions.157
I conducted a qualitative review of the dockets and
relevant case files from the district court cases in the initial
study.158 The pleadings that I typically reviewed in each file,
when publicly available through Bloomberg dockets, included
Motions for Summary Judgment, Complaints, Motions for

percent, respectively. Id. This may be reflective of the subset of cases that
proceed to trial after the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. Id.
151. See infra Part IV.A.5.
152. Rowe, supra note 1, at 195. This percentage is even higher (96.6%)
when looking at whether the trade secret owner received damages on any
claim as well as a permanent injunction. Id. at 195 n.193.
153. Id. at 195; see also id. at 161 (“Permanent injunctive relief is an
available remedy when a plaintiff in a trade secret case cannot show
monetary harm, but it is also available in addition to damages.”).
154. See id. at 196 (suggesting that “a trade secret owner who prevails on
damages is likely to also receive a permanent injunction as a penalty” given
that damages on a trade secret claim are accompanied by a permanent
injunction eighty percent of the time).
155. See id. at 195–96 (reviewing the relationship between the grant or
denial of requests for damages and permanent injunctions).
156. See infra Part IV.A.3.
157. See infra Part IV.A.
158. See supra Part III.A.
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Permanent Injunctions, Trial Briefs, Motions to Dismiss,
Awards of Damages, Judgments, and Verdicts.
I compiled case files from three categories. The first
category was composed of cases where permanent injunctions
were awarded along with damages on the trade secret claim. 159
There were twenty-eight cases in this category and there were
requests for a permanent injunction in about sixty percent of
these cases. The second group of cases were those awarded
damages on the trade secret claims but no permanent
injunction.160 There were eighty-nine cases in this category; of
those only about thirty-eight percent appeared to have moved
for permanent injunctions. The final group of cases were those
awarded permanent injunctions but no damages.161 There were
only five cases in this category. Aside from being a tiny sample,
a review of those cases did not lead to any particularly useful
information relevant to this Article. As such, I decided to focus
the analysis only on the two categories where damages were
awarded, with and without permanent injunctions.162
Using Bloomberg dockets, I obtained the verdict forms,
judgments, and orders relating to permanent injunctions
where available.163 I then spent several months reading
through these court files, from which I then made the
qualitative observations below.164 To encourage consistency, I
reviewed all of the case files myself and prepared an outline
that I used for all of the cases to record my observations. The
outline contained questions relating to the following topics: (1)
ongoing use of the trade secret, (2) relationship between the
parties, (3) status of licensing, (4) type of trade secret, (5)
whether the damages covered the injunction period, (6) details
from the permanent injunction order, (7) the existence and
extent of knowledge about the trade secret, (8) scope of the
injunction order, and (9) showing of future or recurrent
violations.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
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Among the limitations encountered was that not all of the
records were available or accessible through Bloomberg
Dockets. Given that these were trade secret cases, some of the
files were sealed or needed to be obtained from the courthouse.
Sometimes a pleading was listed in the docket, but the
document could not be viewed without a fee. In some cases, I
was able to find missing information from alternative sources,
such as, for example, if there had been an appeal or other
pleadings in the file.
IV. Results and Observations
The following notable observations were made from
analyzing the data set which included about 150 trade secret
decisions terminating between 2000 to 2014 with damages
totaling over $2 billion.165 Results are organized below to
present cases that were granted permanent injunctions with
damages166 and those that did not receive permanent
injunctions but were awarded damages.167 All were successful
on their trade secret claims and received damages but most did
not receive a permanent injunction.168 As an initial matter, a
simple explanation for those where permanent injunctions did
not enter appears to be that the prevailing party (usually the
plaintiff trade secret owner)169 did not ask for it.
Overall, the cases reviewed represented a very broad
range of trade secrets from a wide range of industries. They
also involved a good mix of both technical and business trade
secrets.170 Trade secret cases are generally between employers
and former employees,171 but the parties represented various

165. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 169 (describing the data set from the
initial 2017 study).
166. See infra Part IV.A.
167. See infra Part IV.B.
168. See supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
169. Rowe, supra note 1, at 182.
170. See id. at 185 (providing that fifty-six percent of the analyzed cases
involved business information, twenty-seven percent of the cases involved
technical information, and sixteen percent of the cases involved allegations of
both business and technical information).
171. See id. at 194 (finding that in eighty percent of the analyzed cases,
the parties were competitors, which is “consistent with the typical trade
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types of employment and business relationships.172 Another
very typical defendant includes competitors or a former
employee who left to create a competing enterprise.173 It
appears that most of the cases, however, involved the latter
scenario with competitors or joint ventures gone wrong.174 This
also appears consistent with patent cases, where most
permanent injunctions go to competitors.175 There was a
fascinating range of trade secrets, from touchscreen overlays
that turn regular monitors to touchscreens176 to specialized
lighting for exit signs and emergency lights.177 Unlike in the
patent cases, the type of trade secret or the field/industry did
not seem to have much effect on the injunction analysis.178
In his study of patent permanent injunctions, Professor
Seaman
found
that
“district
courts
exhibit
a
technology-specific bias in applying the facially-neutral
four-factor test in eBay.”179 As the following examples reflect,
however, that did not appear to be the case in the trade secret
cases. For instance, permanent injunctions were granted in all
of these cases, among very diverse industries. In the cable tie
secret misappropriation narrative” where a former employee leaves to join
the employer’s competitor).
172. See id. at 194 n.184 (providing that in twenty percent of cases, the
parties were not competitors).
173. See id. (explaining that twenty-nine percent of the analyzed cases
involved these competitors).
174. See id. at 193–94 (observing that higher damages were awarded
when the parties were competitors).
175. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1990–91 (“Patent holders who
competed with an infringer were granted a permanent injunction in the
overwhelming majority of cases (84%; 150 of 179 cases), while patentees who
were not market competitors rarely succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief
(21%; 8 of 39 cases).”).
176. See, e.g., PQ Labs, Inc. v. Yang Qi, No. 12-0450 CW, 2014 WL
4954161, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014).
177. See, e.g., Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc.,
796 F.3d 576, 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2015).
178. Compare Seaman, supra note 11, at 1953 (finding that permanent
injunction grant rates after eBay varied “significantly by field of technology,
with injunctions nearly always granted in cases involving patented drugs
and biotechnology, but much less often for disputes involving computer
software”) with infra notes 179–192 and accompanying text.
179. Seaman, supra note 11, at 2004.
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industry (injection molding to create plastic cable ties), a
former supplier wrongfully copied and disclosed the plaintiff’s
trade secrets.180 The jury found that the defendant acted in bad
faith because it continued to use the trade secret after having
knowledge of the trade secret misappropriation.181 In another
case involving pointing devices (computer mice) to reduce
carpal tunnel syndrome, the plaintiffs met with the defendant
to produce devices in Taiwan.182 Unfortunately for the plaintiff,
the defendant started manufacturing the product to compete
against the plaintiff.183 Another foreign distribution agreement
went badly for the maker of gummy bear vitamins when its
distributor in the United States misappropriated the trade
secret.184 Similarly, in Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel,
L.L.C.,185 the employee of a subcontractor in Korea who helped
design model trains stole the plaintiff’s trade secrets and gave
them to the defendants.186 The plaintiff was awarded about

180. Third Amended Complaint at 1, Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Bay
State Cable Ties, LLC, No. 4:06-cv-40204-FDS (D. Mass. Oct. 5, 2007), ECF
No. 147; see also Amended Permanent Injunction and Order, Advanced Cable
Ties, Inc. v. Bay State Cable Ties, LLC, No. 4:06-cv-40204-FDS (D. Mass.
Dec. 7, 2009), ECF No. 382 (granting plaintiff’s request for a permanent
injunction).
181. Jury Verdict Form at 1, Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Bay State
Cable Ties, LLC, No. 4:06-cv-40204-FDS (D. Mass. May 18, 2009), ECF No.
298.
182. See Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., 693 F.3d 102,
106, 112 (1st Cir. 2012).
183. Id. at 105–06.
184. See Second Amended Counterclaim at 17–18, Beijing Tong Ren
Tang (USA), Corp. v. TRT USA Corp., No. 5:09-cv-00882 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29,
2010), ECF No. 111 (alleging that the plaintiff misappropriated trade secrets
by using the defendant’s business plans to export its products); Final
Amended Judgment at 2–3, Beijing Tong Ren Tang (USA), Corp. v. TRT USA
Corp., No. 5:09-cv-00882 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2012), ECF No. 336 (finding trade
secret misappropriation and enjoining plaintiffs from selling or distributing
defendant’s products); see also Beijing Tong Ren Tang (USA), Corp. v. TRT
USA Corp., No. C-09-00882 RMW, 2011 WL 13143358, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
23, 2011) (recounting that “[t]he jury found TRT was entitled to recover
$188,837 in compensatory damages on its misappropriation of trade secret
claim”).
185. 472 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2006).
186. Id. at 404.
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$40 million dollars against the defendants and a permanent
injunction.187
One very interesting case involved exam questions and
answers. In Excelsior College v. Frye,188 the plaintiff owned an
exam preparation company and preparation material for the
nursing licensure exam.189 The plaintiff claimed defendants, a
nursing school and one of its employees, copied its course
content and exams to prepare their students for the exam.190
One defendant did so by taking exam preparation courses
offered by plaintiff and by getting the information from
students who had taken the courses.191 The plaintiff received a
permanent injunction.192
A. Cases Receiving Permanent Injunctions
This Part discusses the group of cases where both
permanent injunctions and damages were awarded.193 In most
of the cases where the court granted permanent injunctions,
the trade secret owner also received damages.194 Thus, if eBay
or eBay-like factors were being followed, then one would expect
to see permanent injunction orders with discussions of
irreparable harm, available legal remedies, balance of the
187. See id. at 405 (acknowledging the damages awarded and the
permanent injunction granted at the district court level before reversing the
district court’s injunction and damage award and remanding for a new trial).
188. 306 F. Supp. 2d 226 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
189. Id. at 228.
190. Id.
191. See Excelsior Coll. v. Frye, No. 04-0535-WQH (LSP), 2005 WL
8158185, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2005) (finding that the plaintiff had
presented substantial evidence of defendants’ access to plaintiff’s works,
including one defendant’s own admission that he “incorporated Excelsior
College’s examinations into West Haven BSN Degree Program”).
192. See Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 5–7, Excelsior
Coll. v. Frye, No. 04-0535-WQH (LSP) (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2007), ECF No.
417 (enjoining the defendants from using the plaintiff’s nursing examination
prepatory materials, including practice exams and other exam course
materials, in its own prepatory materials).
193. There were twenty-eight cases in this category and there were
motions for a permanent injunction in about seventeen of these cases.
194. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 196 (noting that a permanent injunction
was issued without damages in only five out of twenty-six cases).

582

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553 (2020)

hardships, and consideration of the public interest. Indeed, an
effect of eBay in patent cases is that patentees must now prove
irreparable harm to receive an injunction.195 However, that
was not quite the case with these trade secret cases.
The injunction orders themselves, when they existed,
tended to be quite perfunctory, with some being clearer and
more precise on the scope than others.196 Certainly, permanent
injunctions appear to have been granted, despite the
availability of adequate legal remedies and accompanied by
damage awards. In fact, the award of punitive damages
(signaling willfulness, bad faith, etc. by the defendant), seemed
highly associated with the granting of a permanent
injunction.197 Moreover, unlike in patent cases where
heightened awareness of non-practicing entities weighed
against permanent injunctions being awarded,198 with the
trade secret cases, almost by default, the party seeking
injunctive relief made ongoing use of the trade secret, thus not
even necessitating any discussion.199
1. Nature of the Injunction Orders
In this group of cases, orders on the motion for permanent
injunction were present in about eighty-five percent of the
cases.200 However, one of the most stark trends in these cases
was the lack of detailed permanent injunction orders. As a
result, there was very little reasoning supporting the grant of

195. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1992 (explaining that before eBay,
“prevailing patentees were presumed to suffer irreparable harm,” but after
the Supreme Court decision “patentees must demonstrate irreparable harm
before an injunction can issue”).
196. See infra Parts IV.A.1–2.
197. See infra Part IV.A.3.
198. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1970 (noting that several district
courts that had denied permanent injunctive relief to non-practicing
patentees cited Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay, which suggested that
“patent holders who do not practice their patents generally should not
receive an injunction because it would give them ‘undue leverage’ in
licensing negotiations”).
199. See infra Part IV.A.5.
200. Of the twenty-eight cases that received both damages and a
permanent injunction, twenty-four had an order on the motion for injunction
in the dockets.
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the orders, nor was there consistent application of the
injunction standards or cases like eBay (at least not
explicitly).201 In fact, in a very procedurally unusual case,
Marine Turbo Engineering, Ltd. v. Turbocharger Services
Worldwide, LLC,202 the court granted a permanent injunction
on summary judgment.203
It was not uncommon that a permanent injunction order
would issue after a jury verdict, without any reasoning from
the court.204 In some cases, there did not even appear to be an
opposition brief filed by the defendant.205 It appeared that not
every motion was accompanied by an opposition from the other
side, because only about forty-five percent of such motions
appeared in the dockets.206 Sometimes, the injunction order
was quite vague and short: for example, one stated only that
defendants are “restrained and enjoined from: [a]ny further
misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets, including but not
limited to hardware and circuitry design schematics, software

201. See infra Part IV.C. It is also worth noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)
requires that injunctive orders provide the reasons for issuance as well as
the specific terms for each injunction.
202. No. 11-60621-CIV, 2012 WL 13005811 (S.D. Fla. July 23, 2012).
203. See id. at *10–11 (granting the plaintiffs’ request to enjoin one of the
defendants, a former employee of the plaintiffs, from competing against the
plaintiffs in the turbocharger industry, but only after the plaintiffs
submitted a more specific proposed order that did not ban the defendant
from all competition with the plaintiffs); but see Consent Judgment at 4–6,
Marine Turbo Eng’g, Ltd. v. Turbocharger Servs. Worldwide, LLC, No.
11-60621-CIV (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2012), ECF No. 359 (granting the parties’
joint motion for a consent judgment, including stipulated injunctions lasting
from one to two years enjoining defendants from doing business in or
performing turbocharger repairs in particular locations and for specific
clients).
204. See, e.g., Amended Permanent Injunction and Order at 2, Advanced
Cable Ties, Inc. v. Bay State Cable Ties, LLC, No. 4:06-cv-40204-FDS (D.
Mass Dec. 7, 2009), ECF No. 382; see also Chetu, Inc. v. Salihu, No.
09-60588-CIV, 2010 WL 1372329, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2010) (granting
plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction after finding that there was no
dispute on the issue).
205. See, e.g., Advanced Cable Ties, Inc. v. Bay State Cable Ties, LLC,
No. 06-40204-FDS, 2009 WL10730417, at *1 (D. Mass. July 28, 2009).
206. Of the twenty-eight cases with permanent injunctions, thirteen had
oppositions to the motions for permanent injunctions filed in the dockets.
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code, customer information, sales and pricing information.”207
Even after a bench trial, one case had no written opinion on
the injunction.208 Interestingly, in one case that involved both
trade secret and patent claims, injunctions were awarded on
both claims; the order on the patent infringement claim
included a very thorough analysis of eBay’s four prongs,209
something that was not done on the trade secret order.210
Nevertheless, one case, Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden
Cryogenics LLC,211 stood out with its very detailed injunction
opinion in which the court applied the injunction standard.212
It included an excellent discussion of irreparable harm.213 The
court credited both sides’ arguments with respect to
irreparable harm and used their arguments to frame the scope
of the injunction.214 Similarly, in Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F

207. Permanent Injunction at 1, PQ Labs, Inc. v. Yang Qi, No.
4:12-cv-00450 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014), ECF No. 193.
208. Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc., No.
2:10-CV-00789, 2014 WL 12844160, at *35 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2014), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, rev’d in part by 796 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding
that the defendant’s misappropriation of trade secrets claim was untimely).
209. Order Granting Brocade’s Motion for Permanent Injunction Re
Patent Infringement at 4–13, Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks,
Inc., No. 5:10-cv-03428 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013), ECF No. 830; Brocade
Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1199 (N.D.
Cal. 2012).
210. See Order Granting Brocade’s Motion for Permanent Injunction Re
Trade Secrets and Denying Brocade’s Motion to Strike at 4–26, Brocade
Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. A10 Networks, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-03428 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
23, 2013), ECF No. 880 (analyzing California law, not eBay). In I-Flow v.
Apex, another case that included a patent claim, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement and consent judgment on the injunction post-verdict.
Order Granting Joint Motion for Consent Judgment and Permanent
Injunction at 1, I-Flow Corp. v. Apex Med. Techs., Inc., No. 3:07-cv-01200
(S.D. Cal. June 15, 2010), ECF No. 503.
211. 630 F. Supp. 2d 853 (S.D. Ohio 2008).
212. Id. at 860–69.
213. Id. at 866–69.
214. See id. at 867–69 (determining that while the cryogenics company
had established a likelihood of success on its copyright infringement claim
against competitor, it would likely fail on its trade secret misappropriation
claim, and a temporary restraining order presented the possibility of
substantial harm to competitor and would not further the public interest).
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Marketing LLC,215 the court explicitly used the eBay
framework and issued a detailed injunction order.216 The court
ruled that irreparable harm was presumed because the jury
found misappropriation.217
Another stand out was Myriad Development, Inc. v.
Alltech, Inc.,218 where the court applied the injunction
standard and granted a narrower injunction than that sought
by the plaintiff.219 The injunction order was detailed and
complex: the defendant was enjoined from using features,
functions, and source code from the misappropriated software
(all listed specifically as separate items).220 The defendant was
also ordered to immediately remove the misappropriated
features and functions from its systems and advised to not
circumvent the order by implementing these features into a
third party’s systems.221 Furthermore, counsel for the
defendant was to file notice with the court certifying
completion of these tasks.222
2. Scope of the Injunctions
The scope of the permanent injunction orders tended to be
a mix of broad and narrowly tailored. However, most seemed
broad, restricting a wide range of activities. One striking
observation was that the length of the injunction was almost

215. No. 3:10-cv-00228-FDW-DSC, 2013 WL 443698 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5,
2013).
216. Id. at *22–25 (outlining the measures required to comply with the
injunction).
217. Id. at *22 (applying North Carolina law).
218. 817 F. Supp. 2d 946 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
219. See Permanent Injunction at 4, 8–11, Myriad Dev., Inc. v. Alltech,
Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00253-JRN (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 517
(concluding that although an injunction was necessary, the injunction sought
by plaintiff to prevent defendant from using an entire system that
incorporated only some features misappropriated from plaintiff was overly
broad).
220. Id. at 12–14.
221. Id. at 14–15.
222. Id. at 17.
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never provided.223 Thus, even though the UTSA prefers an
injunction of definite duration,224 the trend seems to be
otherwise. As illustrated below, some injunctions were
mandatory and others were prohibitory or both. In some cases,
the scope was simple, such as prohibiting disclosure of the
trade secret.225 In other cases, the injunctions were complex,
particularly where directed towards the defendants’
manufacturing of products involving the trade secret.226 In
fact, most seemed to be complex. Sometimes there was
consideration of allowing competitive participation in the
market.227 There were also instances of requiring transfer of
the trade secret from the alleged misappropriator to the trade
secret owner.228
In some cases, the injunction was very broad and without
a time limitation. For example, one court enjoined the
defendant from using, disclosing, or employing the trade
223. See, e.g., Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., Inc.,
No. 2:10-CV-00789, 2014 WL 12844160, at *48 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2014)
(ordering, without designating a specific timeframe, that plaintiff was
permanently enjoined from manufacturing various lighting models and using
materials in its advertising that originated with the defendant).
224. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (discussing that while
the UTSA does not provide for a specific duration, there is a stated
preference for express duration); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) cmt. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N, amended 1985) (stating that injunctions “should last for as
long as is necessary, but no longer than is necessary, to eliminate the
commercial advantage or ‘lead time’ with respect to good faith competitors
that a person has obtained through misappropriation”).
225. See, e.g., Permanent Injunction at 2, Drummond Am. LLC v. Share
Corp., No 1:08-cv-00661 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010), ECF No. 138 (prohibiting
the defendants from disclosing the plaintiff’s trade secrets, among other
things).
226. See, e.g., Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel L.L.C., No. 00-71729,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22680, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2004) (enjoining
defendants from using the plaintiff’s design drawings to manufacture
engines, but allowing the defendants to re-manufacture engines using
independent means). But see Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472
F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing the district court’s injunction and
damage award and remanding for a new trial).
227. See, e.g., Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, No.
2:08-CV-390, 2014 WL 12652324, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2014) (“Nothing in
this injunction Order prevents Defendants from accessing or utilizing
[Plaintiff’s] products through lawful means, including but not limited to
reverse engineering.”).
228. See infra notes 240–241 and accompanying text.
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secret, and required the defendant to destroy the mold that
was made using the trade secret, to provide all copies to the
plaintiff, and to delete all the plaintiff’s information.229 There
was no time limitation on the length of the injunction.230
In another case where the former employee went to a
competitor having signed a noncompetition agreement, the
injunction order appeared to be guided by the factors set forth
in eBay.231 The court granted a worldwide injunction to
prevent the defendant from using, marketing, selling,
distributing, modifying, or licensing any presently existing or
future derivative versions of the product in question.232 There
was no time limitation (thus the damages appeared to cover
the period of the injunction).233 This case was reviewed on
appeal and the permanent injunction was upheld.234
In another case with a detailed order and no time
limitation, the defendant was prohibited from using,
disclosing, or offering for sale any informational products
containing or derived from the trade secret.235 Furthermore, for
ninety days the defendant was barred from selling any product
that they created.236 After ninety days, they could sell products
that they created in a “clean room” process (the order sets out
detailed procedures for a clean room).237 The order also
provided for a compliance check: “[F]or a period of two (2)
years . . . [the defendants are required to] make available for
inspection all computers . . . [and] such inspection shall be
229. Permanent Injunction and Order at 2–4, Advanced Cable Ties, Inc.
v. Bay State Cable Ties, LLC, No. 4:06-cv-40204 (D. Mass. July 28, 2009),
ECF No. 355.
230. Id.
231. Second Amended Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 2–4,
Aspen Tech., Inc. v. Kunt, No. 4:10-cv-01127 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2014), ECF
No. 759.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Aspen Tech., Inc. v. M3 Tech., Inc., 569 F. App’x 259, 272–73 (5th
Cir. 2014).
235. Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F Mktg. LLC, No. 3:10-cv-00228-FDW-DSC,
2013 WL 443698, at *23–24 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2013).
236. Id. at *23.
237. Id. at *23–24.
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performed by an independent, third party forensic
examiner . . . .”238
In Chetu, Inc. v. Salihu,239 the court provided no analysis
or time limitation, although the defendant was prohibited from
accessing the plaintiff’s computer systems; providing goods or
services to certain named clients of the plaintiff; and using,
viewing, accessing, reverse engineering, copying, or modifying
the trade secrets.240 The defendant was also ordered to return
and destroy the trade secrets.241
A two-year limitation was imposed in another case with a
broad injunction.242 The defendant was enjoined from
“showing, offering for sale, selling, marketing, manufacturing,
distributing, or displaying the Enjoined Products” derived from
the computer mouse products that defendant had
manufactured for the plaintiff.243 The defendant was also
ordered to recall any orders in transit for any of the enjoined
products which were not previously recalled under the
preliminary injunction.244 In addition, it was to recall from all
of its distributors all inventory of the products and return to
the plaintiff all information, including firmware.245 A two-year
injunction was also entered in Innovative Solutions v. J2.246
The trade secrets included source code, algorithms, and testing
238. Id. at *24.
239. No. 09-60588-CIV, 2010 WL 1372329 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2010).
240. Permanent Injunction at 1–2, Chetu, Inc. v. Salihu, No. 09-cv-60588
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2010), ECF No. 161 (ordering that defendants were also
permanently prohibited from accessing plaintiff’s computer systems).
241. Id. at 2.
242. See Permanent Injunction Order at 1, Contour Design, Inc. v.
Chance Mold Steel Co., No. 1:09-cv-00451 (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 2009), ECF No.
229 (describing the misappropriation of trade secrets for different types of
computer mice and the necessary drawings and files needed to manufacture
them).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2.
245. See id. (requiring that the defendants had to return all “electronic
CAD files, drawings, and related information” that could be used to make the
enjoined products).
246. See Consent Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 1, Innovative
Sols. & Support, Inc. v. J2, Inc., No. 2:05-cv-02665 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 13,
2005), ECF No. 821 (remarking that the parties entered a settlement
agreement for the injunction).
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procedures.247 The court issued a head-start injunction
preventing the defendant from using or disclosing all of the six
trade secrets specifically listed, and from manufacturing,
developing, or selling anything that qualifies as a trade secret
or a derivative therefrom for two years.248
In an example of a case with a narrow injunction and no
time limitation, the defendant was essentially enjoined from
“using, revealing, [or] disposing of” the trade secret
information.249 The entire list of prohibited acts was a mere
two lines long.250 Incidentally, damages in this case were also
relatively low (only $60,000).251 Perhaps this reflected the
court’s judgment on the overall value of the plaintiff’s trade
secret?
There was one case where a very short duration was
specified, but this was a stipulated order between the parties.
In Drummond American, LLC v. Share Corp.,252 a former
independent sales agent left to join a competitor.253 The case
involved business trade secrets such as sales information,
customer information, customer lists, and pricing information
involving sales of chemicals and hardware (disinfectants,
cleaners, and degreasers for floor maintenance).254 The length
of the injunction was about one to four months.255 The
247. See id. at 2 (explaining that the trade secrets involved algorithms
for computing altitude and air pressure).
248. See id. at 3 (concluding that “officers, agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys” of the defendant were prohibited from using the trade
secrets).
249. See Final Judgment at 3, Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott, No.
4:09-cv-01689 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 3, 2009), ECF No. 106 (ordering that defendant
was enjoined from destroying anything that contained the plaintiff’s data).
250. Id.
251. See id. at 2 (stating that the plaintiff also obtained judgment
against the defendant for attorney’s fees in the amount of $83,000).
252. 692 F. Supp. 2d 650, 652 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
253. Id. at 652.
254. See id. at 654 (noting the case also involved a nondisclosure
agreement violation).
255. See Permanent Injunction at 1–2, Drummond Am., L.L.C. v. Share
Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00661 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2008), ECF No. 138 (remarking
that some defendants were enjoined longer than others for soliciting orders
from plaintiff’s customers).
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defendants were prohibited from soliciting orders, selling to
certain customers, and using or disclosing the trade secrets.256
A stipulated order did not always mean a shorter
duration. In I-Flow v. Apex,257 the parties entered into a
settlement agreement and consent judgment after the
verdict.258 The defendant was retained as a supplier to help
develop a pump system for pain management but was secretly
developing his own pump to compete with the plaintiff.259 He is
alleged to have taken the position under false pretenses.260 The
stipulated order enjoined the defendant, for fifteen years, from
any and all uses of the trade secret, making or selling any
pump that includes a material that incorporates the trade
secret, or disclosing the trade secret.261 The defendant was
allowed a sell-off period to manufacture and sell a certain
number of units after 180 days.262
In a case with a record highest amount of damages ($919.9
million) among those in the dataset, E.I. DuPont v. Kolon,263
the court granted a worldwide injunction of twenty years
duration and no geographic limitation.264 This included a
production injunction prohibiting the defendant from
256. See id. (concluding that the defendants were enjoined from using
any of the plaintiff’s confidential resources regarding their customers or
potential customers).
257.
I-Flow Corp. v. Apex Med. Techs., Inc., No. 3:07-cv-01200, 2010 WL
114005 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010).
258. See Order Granting Joint Motion for Consent Judgment and
Permanent Injunction at 1, I-Flow Corp. v. Apex Med. Techs., Inc., No.
3:07-cv-01200 (S.D. Cal. Jun. 29, 2007), ECF No. 503 (recounting that the
jury found that the defendants had misappropriated secrets, breached the
plaintiff’s confidence, and competed unfairly).
259. See id. (explaining that defendants had “manufactured, sold, and/or
distributed” the pump system domestically and abroad).
260. See id. (stating that the plaintiff had disclosed “non-trade secrets
confidential business and technical information” in confidence).
261. See id. at 2 (ordering that the defendants were also enjoined from
using, selling, distributing, or importing the infringing products of the
plaintiff’s patents for the remainder of the patent’s term).
262. See id. at 3 (determining that the defendants could sell no more
than 3000 units in the United States for ninety days).
263. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691,
697– 98, 704 (E.D. Va. 2012).
264. See id. at 695 (discussing defendants retaining former DuPont
employees and paying them to divulge trade secrets for the fiber Kevlar).
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manufacturing, using, marketing, or selling the trade secrets,
and the defendant was also broadly enjoined from processing,
publishing, disclosing, or using, in any form, the 149 trade
secrets which were misappropriated.265 The defendants were
also ordered to allow a forensic expert to confirm that the trade
secrets were removed from their network.266
3. Monetary Relief and Punitive Damages
General equitable principles, including those in eBay, call
for consideration of whether the party seeking a permanent
injunction has available remedies at law.267 The general view
is that if monetary damages are enough to make the plaintiff
trade secret owner whole, then the equitable relief from an
injunction is not necessary.268 A property view espouses more
of an all-or-nothing standard whereby upon proving liability,
the trade secret owner receives (almost automatically)
damages and a permanent injunction.269 Similarly, this was
the state of things in patent law prior to eBay.270 A review of
the trade secret cases here confirms that this traditional
property view continues to hold for trade secret litigation.271
Most of the time, there was an overlap between the grant of a
permanent injunction and the receipt of damages.272
Indeed, while the purpose of an injunction is to prevent
future violations (i.e. future misappropriation of the trade
265. See id. (including that the defendant was also required to return all
purloined trade secrets).
266. Id.
267. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(explaining that no adequate remedies at law is one of four factors
considered when determining whether to award a permanent injunction).
268. See id. (stating the plaintiff must demonstrate that damages “are
inadequate to compensate for [their] injury”).
269. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The essence of
all property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is certainly
not inconsequential.”).
270. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that “an injunction should issue once infringement
has been established unless there is sufficient reason for denying it”).
271. See infra notes 277–295 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 277–295 and accompanying text.
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secrets), this consideration did not appear explicitly as part of
the reasoning for denying or granting the injunctions. Rather,
what seems to most influence the grant of an injunction, or at
least appear most frequently along with the grant of an
injunction (or denial), seems to be whether there was a finding
of willfulness, bad faith, or an award of punitive damages.273 In
fact, most of the time, a prevailing party who received punitive
damages also received an injunction.274 This is consistent with
patent cases, where willful infringement was correlated with
the grant of injunctions post eBay.275
For example, in Aspen v. Tekin Hunt,276 the plaintiff
received $2 million in actual damages, $2.8 million in lost
profits, and $1 million in punitive damages as well as a
worldwide injunction (of unlimited duration) against the
defendant.277 In another case, the defendant was also subject
to a broad injunction, and the damages appeared to cover the
injunction period where a court awarded an injunction along
with $693,588 in damages plus over $1 million in punitive
damages against the defendants.278 Even higher punitive
damages of $7.5 million were ordered against a defendant in

273. See, e.g., infra notes 277–284 and accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., infra notes 277–284 and accompanying text.
275. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1953 (writing that other factors for
granting injunctions included “the patentee’s willingness to license the
patented technology” and “whether the patented technology covers only a
small component of the infringing product”).
276. Aspen Tech., Inc. v. Kunt, No. 4:10-cv-01127, 2011 WL 86556 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 10, 2011).
277. See Second Amended Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction at
1, Aspen Tech., Inc. v. Kunt, No. 4:10-cv-01127 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010), ECF
No. 759 (determining that the total recovery from the defendant was
$10,800,000 in damages).
278. See Excelsior Coll. v. Frye, No. 04CV0535WQH, 2007 WL 672517, at
*1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (discussing how the jury found for the plaintiffs
on their claims of copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation).
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another case,279 yet a permanent injunction was entered at the
agreement of the parties.280
In one case where the trade secrets were related to the
manufacturing of artificial stone, the plaintiff received $2.5
million in damages.281 The defendant was also enjoined from
manufacturing, distributing, marketing, or selling any
products created from the trade secrets.282 In addition, the
court ordered the defendant to destroy products containing the
trade secret.283 The defendant argued that the order to destroy
products was double dipping, since the plaintiff recovered
damages (lost profits) on those products, which must now also
be destroyed, and thus should not count as lost sales.284 The
argument was to no avail.285

279. See Order at 2, Drummond Am., L.L.C. v. Share Corp., No.
1:08-cv-00661-RP (W.D. Tex. June 30, 2010), ECF No. 161 (recalling that the
jury found that defendants had acted with malice and awarded punitive
damages to the other defendants). The jury also awarded $241,000 in
compensatory damages on the trade secret claim against that defendant. Id.
280. See Permanent Injunction at 1, Drummond Am., L.L.C. v. Share
Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00661-RP (W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2010), ECF No. 138
(remarking that defendants were enjoined from soliciting orders from
plaintiff’s customers).
281. See Final Judgment at 3, Eldorado Stone LLC v. Renaissance Stone,
No. 3:04-cv-02562-JM-CAB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007), ECF No. 413 (noting
that the court denied the defendant’s motion for new trial conditioned upon
plaintiff’s acceptance of a remittitur on compensatory damages to
approximately $2.5 million).
282. See id. at 9–10 (determining that defendants could not use the
plaintiff’s trade secrets including color formulas, techniques, or processes).
283. See id. at 10 (requiring that the defendants destroy “all indicia of
color formulas, production formulas and color application processes”).
284. See Defendants’ Amended Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Application for
Permanent Injunction at 3, Eldorado Stone LLC v. Renaissance Stone, No.
3:04-cv-02562 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2007), ECF No. 321 (“Plaintiffs are seeking
to destroy products that were sold but they previously recovered damages for
these sales.”).
285. See Final Judgment at 10, Eldorado Stone LLC v. Renaissance
Stone, No. 3:04-cv-02562-JM-CAB (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2007), ECF No. 413
(ordering defendants to destroy all products using the plaintiff’s trade
secrets).
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One case that appeared to be an exception to this general
pattern was Myriad v. Alltech.286 In this case, the damages did
not appear to cover the injunction period.287 The plaintiff
received $250,000 in reasonable royalties in compensation for
the amount of a license, not future use of the trade secret.288
The court applied the equitable injunction standard and
granted a narrower injunction than that sought by plaintiff.289
On the question of punitive damages, a very interesting
case was Molly Strong v. Deckers Outdoor,290 which involved
the design of boots. The jury awarded $2 million in
compensatory damages to the plaintiff, but found no
willfulness.291 As a result, the trial court refused to award
punitive damages.292 On appeal, however, the appeals court
ruled that a court can award punitive damages293 even if the

286. Myriad Dev., Inc. v. Alltech, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00253-JRN, 817 F.
Supp. 2d 946 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011).
287. See Final Judgment at 35, Myriad Dev., Inc. v. Alltech, Inc., No.
1:08-cv-00253-JRN (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 518 (noting that the
reasonable royalty amount represents the “fair price for [plaintiff’s] trade
secrets”).
288. See id. at 35–44 (discussing the sufficiency of the evidence for the
determination of the reasonable royalty award based on the jury’s findings).
289. See Permanent Injunction at 12–17, Myriad Dev., Inc. v. Alltech,
Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00253 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 517 (granting the
plaintiff’s injunction regarding certain technologies but denying it for
others).
290.
Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1104
(9th Cir. 2001).
291. See id. at 1104 (stating that the plaintiff was appealing the district
court’s refusal to award exemplary damages and attorney’s fees).
292. See id. at 1111 (stating that the district court did not award punitive
damages because the jury did not find that defendants acted “with actual
fraud and/or malice”).
293. For another case with a detailed discussion of exemplary damages,
see Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, No. 2:08-cv-00921, 2012 WL 4467519,
at *9 (D. Utah Sept. 27, 2012) (awarding plaintiff $2.92 million dollars in
damages and $1.46 million in punitive damages; plaintiff did not make a
request for an injunction).
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jury does not find willfulness.294 Subsequently, on remand, the
trial court awarded $2.45 million in punitive damages.295
4. Trade Secrets with a Side of Patents
Several of the cases involved both patent and trade secret
claims. Of those, most were related to medical device patents.
It is interesting to see how the analysis of the interplay
between damages and permanent injunctive relief in those
cases seemed more nuanced. Arguably, this may be because
the court (or the attorneys’ briefs) engaged in a more
patent-like approach to the injunction arguments. It may also
be that the presence of a patent claim positively influences the
award of a permanent injunction on a trade secret claim. The
initial study revealed that permanent injunctions were issued
after trial twenty percent of the time during the fifteen-year
period studied, from 2000 to 2014.296 This rate compares to a
72.5% grant rate for permanent injunctions in patent cases
(from 2006 to 2013).297
Retractable Tech v. Occupational & Medical Innovations298
included both a patent infringement and a trade secret
misappropriation claim involving medical syringes.299 The jury
awarded plaintiff $1.5 million on the patent claims and $2.2
million in trade secret damages.300 While the permanent
injunction order indicated that the injunction was issued on
both the trade secret and patent claims, the permanent
injunction itself did not mention the trade secrets (the
294. See Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1112 (reversing the district court’s
refusal to award punitive damages and remanding for the district court to
determine whether the defendant’s misappropriation was “willful and
malicious”).
295. See generally Order, Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.,
No. 9:95-cv-00027-CCL (D. Mont. Oct. 1, 2002), ECF No. 352 (awarding
exemplary damages to plaintiff and her company on remand).
296. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 195 (comparing this to the rates that
preliminary injunctions were granted or denied).
297. Seaman, supra note 11, at 1982–83.
298. Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Occupational & Med. Innovations, Ltd.,
No. 6:08 CV 120, 2010 WL 3199624 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
299. Id. at *1.
300. Id.
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defendant was enjoined from infringing the patent).301
Furthermore, the court applied eBay on the patent injunction
analysis and acknowledged that the injunction would cover
some of the damages period.302 The court requested that the
defendant file a motion for a credit for the overlap, but such a
motion did not appear in the court file.303
In another medical device case, Ichor Medical Systems,
Inc. v. Walters,304 the parties were working together and the
defendant signed a nondisclosure agreement.305 The trade
secrets included a method of creating electrical fields around
tumor cells.306 However, the defendant later filed patent
applications on the plaintiff’s invention.307 The jury awarded
$13.5 million in compensatory damages and $100,000 in
punitive damages against the defendant.308 The plaintiff did
not seek future damages, but sought damages only up to the
date of trial.309 The plaintiff reserved the right to seek an
equitable assignment in lieu of future damages, and the court
ordered equitable assignment of the defendant’s patent to the
plaintiff.310 There did not appear to be a request for permanent
injunction.311
301. See id. at *4 (showing that the plaintiff moved to enjoin the
defendant “from making, using, importing, selling, and/or offering to sell [the
plaintiff’s] syringes in the United States”).
302. See id. at *4–6 (reasoning that monetary damages would be
inadequate because the defendant was bankrupt).
303. See id. at *6 (discussing the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff
could not obtain an injunction on the syringes because it was seeking
damages).
304. Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters, No. 03-56689 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
2003).
305. Defendant’s Trial Brief at 3, Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters, No.
99-CV-1332-J (AJB) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014), ECF No. 414.
306. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 2, Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters, No.
99-CV-1332-J (AJB) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014), ECF No. 423.
307. Id. at 4.
308. Judgment at 2–3, Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters, No. 99-CV-1332-J
(AJB) (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2013), ECF No. 485.
309. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief at 50, Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters, No.
99-CV-1332-J (AJB) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014), ECF No. 423.
310. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of Equitable
Assignment of Patent Rights at 1, 19, Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters, No.
99-CV-1332-J (AJB) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014), ECF No. 484 (noting that when
a party improperly obtains a patent based on another’s trade secret,
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A similar story occurred between the parties in Russo v.
Ballard Medical Products.312 The plaintiff was an independent
inventor and was in negotiations with the defendant.313 The
defendant allegedly stole the design and obtained two patents
on the invention.314 The jury found for the plaintiff and
awarded $20 million in damages.315 The jury also found that
the conduct was willful, but the court did not award punitive
damages because “the court does not find a public objective
would be served by awarding exemplary damages.”316 There
does not appear to have been a request for an injunction.317
Finally, a medical device case related to MRI machines,
LBDS Holding Co. v. ISOL Technology Inc.318 is instructive,
not so much on injunctions, but in serving as a word of caution
in trade secret litigation. The plaintiff entered into a
technology service agreement for the defendants to retrofit
MRI machines with the plaintiff’s software.319 However, the
defendant ended up retrofitting the plaintiff’s competitors’
machines.320 The jury found against the defendant and

“assignment of the patent to the aggrieved party is an appropriate remedy
and the only means of returning the trade secret to its rightful owner”).
311. See generally Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, Ichor Med. Sys., Inc. v. Walters,
No. 99-CV-1332-J (AJB) (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014), ECF No. 423 (arguing for
damages rather than injunctive relief).
312. 550 F.3d 1004 (10th Cir. 2008).
313. See id. at 1007–08 (discussing how the plaintiff was retained by the
defendant as a consultant for the purposes of improving the defendant’s
design for a medical device).
314. See id. at 1008 (explaining how the defendant used the plaintiff’s
prototypes and drawings to obtain the patents).
315. See id. at 1009 (noting that the jury awarded $17 million for the
misappropriation claim and $3 million for the breach of contract claim).
316. Russo v. Ballard Med. Products, No. 2:05-CV-59 TC, 2007 WL
752164, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 7, 2007).
317. See id. at *6 (granting the plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment
interest, exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees).
318. No. 6:11-CV-428, 2015 WL 12765990, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2011)
(vacating the jury verdict due to the plaintiff’s fraudulent conduct).
319. Id. at *4.
320. Id. at *1.
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awarded $760,693 with no exemplary damages.321 However,
the court later learned that the plaintiff had used forged and
fake documents during the trial as evidence for its damages.322
Therefore, the court reversed the jury verdict, dismissed the
case with prejudice and ordered the plaintiff to pay the
defendant’s attorney fees.323
5. Ongoing Use of the Trade Secret in Business
Ongoing use of the trade secret by the parties could be
folded into balancing of the harms between the moving and
opposing parties if the injunction were to enter. Thus, in
patent cases, the fact that a plaintiff is a non-practicing entity
tends to suggest that it will be less harmed without a
permanent injunction compared to a plaintiff that is making
continuing use of the patent in its business.324 Overall, this
factor did not seem to have mattered much in these cases.
There tended to be ongoing use in virtually all of the cases, in
contrast to the high number of non-practicing entities in the
patent cases.325 Actually, the plaintiff or trade secret owner’s
continuing use in its business was present in every case
reviewed. With respect to the defendant, however, the extent
or amount of its use of the trade secret was generally not
discussed. Relatedly, discussions of the extent to which the
trade secret was used, whether it was a small component or a
large component of a product created or derived from the
misappropriated trade secret, was not generally part of the
injunction orders.
In Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott,326 the plaintiff energy
company hired the defendant to conduct analysis of

321. Jury Verdict at 5, LBDS Holding Co. v. ISOL Tech. Inc., No.
6:11-CV-00428, (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2011), ECF No. 168.
322. LBDS Holding Co., 2015 WL 12765990, at *4.
323. Id. at *5.
324. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 1953 (noting that “district courts
appear to have adopted a de facto rule against injunctive relief” for entities
“who do not directly compete in a product market against an infringer”).
325. Id. at 1953, 1981 (noting that patent owners such as non-practicing
entities received, disproportionally, injunctive relief from courts due to a lack
of proof of irreparable harm).
326. No. 4:09-CV-01689, 2011 WL 1157334 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2011).
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hydrocarbon reserves.327 The defendant resigned after working
for only six months, and since he allegedly destroyed the trade
secret prior to leaving, it would have had to be re-created.328
Thus, he was not alleged to have been making ongoing use of
the trade secret in his business.329 In Mike’s Train House,
however, where both parties would continue to manufacture a
similar product, the defendant was enjoined from using the
plaintiff’s existing design drawings to manufacture engines,
but was not enjoined from manufacturing future engines that
were created from independent means.330
B. Damages Without Permanent Injunctions
In those cases where the prevailing trade secret owner
was awarded damages but no permanent injunction entered, it
was difficult to glean any meaningful patterns.331 Either there
was no written opinion,332 or in many cases the prevailing
trade secret owner simply did not move for a permanent
injunction.333 I did not seem to come across cases where the
injunction was denied because the trade secret no longer
existed.334 Nor was the ongoing value of the trade secret of
consequence. Whether the defendants continued to use the
trade secret after knowledge or notice of their
327. Id. at *1.
328. Id. at *1–2.
329. See id. at *6–7 (deciding that deleting data did not constitute “use”).
330. See Mike’s Train House, Inc. v. Lionel L.L.C., No. 00-71729, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22680, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2004) (describing scope
of injunction).
331. There were eighty-nine cases in this category; of those only about
thirty-eight percent appeared to have had permanent injunction requests.
See supra Part III.B.
332. See, e.g., Inflatable Tech. Corp. v. Cox, No. 3:00-cv-00145-RV (N.D.
Fla. Apr. 10, 2000). Orders on the motion for permanent injunction were
present in about twenty-nine percent of the cases, compared to eighty-five
percent in the group of cases awarding both permanent injunctions and
damages. See supra Part III.A.
333. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
334. Cf. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, amended
1985) (requiring a court to terminate an injunction when the trade secret at
issue ceases to exist).
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misappropriation was discussed in some cases,335 and this fact
tended toward granting the injunction.336 The presence of bad
faith, when there was such a finding by the jury, certainly
seemed to have highly influenced the grant of an injunction.337
In one notable case, Bianco v. Globus Medical, Inc.,338 the
court chose an alternative equitable remedy rather than a
permanent injunction.339 There were several thorough opinions
in this medical device case relating to trade secrets in spinal
implants.340 Of note procedurally is that the court denied the
motion for a permanent injunction, but in a procedure under
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,341 granted the request to pay
ongoing royalties in lieu of an injunction.342 It awarded five
percent of net sales on future sales.343 This was consistent with
a rate awarded by the jury for past damages.344 The court
considered the grant of the ongoing royalty part of an equitable
proceeding.345

335. See supra notes 174–181 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part IV.A.
338. 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 931 (E.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d, 618 F. App’x 1032,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
339. See id. at 932 (awarding Bianco an ongoing royalty—in lieu of an
injunction—on Globus Medical, Inc.’s future sales).
340. See, e.g., Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB, 2014
WL 5462388 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2014); Bianco, 2014 WL 3422000 (E.D. Tex.
July 14, 2014); Bianco, 2014 WL 1904228 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2014); Bianco,
2014 WL 1904646 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2014); Bianco, 2014 WL 1049067 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 17, 2014); Bianco, 2014 WL 977686 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 06, 2014);
Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 565 (E.D. Tex. 2014); Bianco v.
Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929 (E.D. Tex. 2014); Bianco v. Globus
Med., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-147-JRG, 2012 WL 5610371 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2012).
341. 504 F.3d 1293, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming the trial court’s
discretion to award “an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an
injunction” but suggesting the trial court should provide reasoning to
support such discretion).
342. Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 929, 932 (E.D. Tex.
2014).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 943 (finding that the five percent ongoing royalty rate of net
sales on future sales equals the amount determined by the jury for past
damages).
345. Id. at 934 (determining that “award of an ongoing royalty is a form
of equitable relief”).
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In many of the cases where permanent injunctions were
not awarded to trade secret owners, it appears to have been
because they were not requested. Motions were filed for
permanent injunction in only thirty-eight percent of these
cases.346 Incidentally, this is consistent with the finding from
the initial study that requests for preliminary injunctions were
not filed fifty-three percent of the time.347 Thus, even where
there was a finding of liability against the defendant, and the
defendant was ordered to pay damages, the plaintiff did not
request a permanent injunction.348 It would be interesting to
know why that was the case and what considerations led to the
decisions not to seek an injunction.349 In one case, the plaintiff
seemed to make the decision while the jury was still out. In
Member Services, Inc. v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
New York,350 the plaintiff withdrew its motion for a permanent
injunction while the jury was deliberating.351 The jury ended
up awarding $16 million in reasonable royalties and $10
million in punitive damages.352
Some exemplar circumstances in this group of cases are
provided below from which the reader may wish to speculate
about the decision not to seek an injunction. Could it be

346. Written oppositions to the motions for permanent injunctions in
those cases were filed in about twenty-five percent of the cases.
347. Rowe, supra note 1, at 195 n.189.
348. When I could not find a motion or request for an injunction
anywhere in the docket, I categorized the case as one where a request was
not made. However, it is possible that in some of these cases, requests may
have been made but are somehow not indicated on the docket.
349. Further research might consider, for instance, whether lawyering
skills or familiarity with trade secret litigation, litigation strategy, funding
structures, misunderstanding of trade secret law, perceived value of the
trade secrets, or client preferences may play a role in the decision not to
request an injunction.
350. No. 3:06-CV-1164 (TJM/DEP), 2009 WL 2383980 (N.D.N.Y. July 30,
2009).
351. See Minute Entry, Member Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. of N.Y.,
No. 3:06-CV-1164-DEP (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2011) (“Outside the presence of the
jury, plaintiffs’ counsel withdraws claim for injunctive relief.”).
352. Jury Verdict Form at 3, Member Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. of
N.Y., No. 3:06-CV-1164 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2011), ECF No. 397; see also
Minute Entry, supra note 351 (describing proceedings).
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signaling from the amount of damages received?353 An
assessment of the likelihood that an injunction would be
awarded in light of the amount or type of damages awarded?
Whether there was a finding of willfulness or award of
punitive damages?354 Who the parties are and whether it is a
David versus Goliath story? Whether the plaintiff initially
received a preliminary injunction?355
In one case, the jury awarded $1.6 million to the plaintiff
but the judge reduced it to $46,588; perhaps that dissuaded
the plaintiff from requesting an injunction?356 In another, a
plaintiff initially was denied a preliminary injunction yet
ended up receiving a $17.9 million jury award on its trade
secret claim.357 An inventor in the oil and gas industry was
awarded $600,000 in compensatory damages and $7.5 million
in punitive damages, but did not request an injunction.358
Other cases had even higher compensatory awards yet
still did not request permanent injunctions, such as cases with
$15 million,359 and $21.3 million in reasonable royalties and
$10 million in punitive damages.360 In Techforward Inc. v. Best
353. Interestingly, in the cases where no damages were awarded,
motions for permanent injunction were made only ten percent of the time.
This could be because there was likely no finding of liability in most of these
cases and thus a recognition that a motion for a permanent injunction may
be futile. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part IV.A.3.
355. See Rowe, supra note 1, at 195 (finding preliminary injunctions were
granted in twenty-four percent of the cases which awarded damages).
356. ABT, Inc. v. Juszczyk, No. 5:09CV119-RLV, 2012 WL 117142, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2012) (awarding monetary damages without referring to
any injunction request)
357. Judgment at 1, Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins., No.
4:00-CV-00070-CEJ (E.D. Mo. Jan. 14, 2000), ECF. No. 359, aff’d, Bancorp
Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
358. Final Judgment, Varco, L.P. v. Bohnsack, No. 4:08-cv-01481 (S.D.
Tex. May. 13, 2008), ECF No. 145, aff’d, Bohnsack v. Varco, L.P., 668 F.3d
262, 272 (5th Cir. 2012).
359. GlobeRanger Corp. v. Software AG USA, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-0403-B,
2015 WL 3648577, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 2015), aff’d, 836 F.3d 477, 503
(5th Cir. 2016).
360. Jury Verdict at 2, Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Monitor Clipper Partners,
LLC, No. 4:08-CV-00840 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 12, 2008), ECF No. 527, aff’d, 758
F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2014).
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Buy Co.,361 the jury awarded $22 million in damages and $5
million in punitive damages against defendant Best Buy.362 In
another case against a well-known defendant, Design
Innovations Inc. v. Fisher-Price Inc.,363 involving the
misappropriation of a concept for new toys, the jury awarded
$1.7 million to the plaintiff, but there was no finding of
willfulness or an award of punitive damages.364
Similarly, injunctions were not requested in some cases
with awards under $1 million. In West Coast Nets Inc. v. Fitec
International Inc.,365 the parties were negotiating toward a
partnership. They terminated and then the defendant
allegedly stole the idea related to the design and method of
constructing fishing nets.366 The jury found for the plaintiff
and awarded $780,000, but there was no request for an
injunction.367
In a case in the real estate industry, the plaintiff won on
its trade secret claim and was awarded $225,000 in damages,
but lost on its other counts.368 It did not file for an
injunction.369 In another under-a-million-dollar award case, the
plaintiff received $312,192, and there was a finding of no
willfulness.370 In Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson,371
361. No. 2:11-cv-01313 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011).
362. Order of Judgment, Techforward, Inc. v. Best Buy Co., No.
2:11-cv-01313-ODW-JEM (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011), ECF No. 241.
363. 450 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Conn. 2006).
364. Verdict and Settlement Summary, Design Innovations Inc. v.
Fisher-Price, Inc., No. 3:03-cv-222-JBA, 2006 WL 1719592 (D. Conn. Feb. 6,
2006) (awarding the plaintiff royalties resulting from the product sales but
concluding that it was not entitled to punitive damages).
365. No. 1:01-cv-01352-UU (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2001).
366. First Amended Complaint at 7–8, West Coast Nets v. Fitec Int’l,
Inc., No. 1:01-CV-01352-UU (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2001), ECF No. 4.
367. Final Judgment, West Coast Nets v. Fitec Int’l, Inc., No.
1:01-CV-01352-UU, (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2001), ECF No. 252.
368. Amended Judgment at 1–7, Lochmere Dev. Grp. Inc. v. H.D. Assoc.
L.P., No. 8:00-CV-01026-JDW (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2000), ECF No. 310.
369. Id.
370. Jury Verdict at 3–4, Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No.
1:09-cv-22607-EGT (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2009), ECF No. 200, aff’d, 537 F. App’x
815 (11th Cir. 2013).
371. 508 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2007).
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involving a class action settlement business, compensatory
damages were $200,000 and so were the punitive damages.372
C. Note on Irreparable Harm
There was very little discussion of hardships and the
public interest in the injunction orders. Instead, among the
permanent injunction equitable factors, irreparable harm
seemed the most significant in terms of tipping the scale
toward grant or denial. This was consistent with what appears
in the published cases.373 Some of the cases adopted the view
that irreparable harm was presumed.374 One case that
articulated the traditional view in trade secrecy is E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc.375 In that case, the
defendant hired several former employees as consultants to
use a process for producing paramid fiber products that
DuPont sells under the Kevlar brand name.376 The plaintiff
argued that it was entitled to a permanent injunction simply
because the defendant was found to have violated the statute
that provides for injunctive relief, namely, the Virginia
UTSA.377 The court agreed.378
Another case with an excellent discussion of irreparable
harm is Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC.379 The
defendant in that case used to work for the plaintiff and left to
372. Id. at 282.
373. See supra Part II.B.2.
374. Bridgetree, Inc. v. Red F Mktg. LLC, No. 3:10-CV-00228-FDW-DSC,
2013 WL 443698, at *22 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2013) (finding irreparable harm
presumed once there has been a finding of misappropriation).
375. 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697–98, 704 (E.D. Va. 2012) (following state
law to conclude that the plaintiff did not have to prove irreparable harm once
it demonstrated that the defendant violated the state statute that authorized
injunctive relief), vacated and remanded, 564 F. App’x 710 (4th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 574 U.S. 987 (2014).
376. Id. at 695 (describing the employment of DuPont’s former employees
with the purpose of acquiring DuPont’s trade secrets).
377. Id. at 697–99 (citing case law to contend that Virginia law rather
than the traditional four-factor test establishes the standard for deciding
whether to issue a permanent injunction).
378. Id. at 706 (applying the state law principles to the permanent
injunction request in order to avoid violating Erie).
379. No. 2:08-cv-390, 2014 WL 12652324, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 4,
2014) (analyzing both parties’ views of irreparable harm).
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compete.380 The case contained a detailed opinion on the
request for a permanent injunction.381 It included an excellent
discussion of irreparable harm.382 The court credited both
sides’ arguments and used them to frame the scope of the
injunction.383 The injunction was narrowly tailored to prevent
the defendant from accessing, referencing, and using any shop
drawings, or manufacturing, fabricating, producing any part or
product using the trade secrets.384 Yet the court was mindful of
allowing competitive participation in the market.385 There was
also a good discussion of punitive damages in the opinion.386
The court found future harm to the plaintiff even though the
court split on the irreparable harm presumption (which went
to limit the scope of the injunction).387
What was particularly interesting about this case
procedurally was that the court initially found for the
defendants, on summary judgment, that there was no
misappropriation.388 The plaintiff appealed the decision and
the appeals court reversed.389 The case then went to trial. At
trial, the jury found for the plaintiff including a finding of
willful infringement.390 The jury awarded damages in the
amount of $1,047,000 against all the defendants and $250,000
in punitive damages against the first two defendants.391

380. Id. at *1–2.
381. Id. at *3–11.
382. Id. at *5–6.
383. Id. at *6.
384. Id. at *9–11.
385. Id. at *6–7.
386. Id. at *11–15.
387. Id. at *6.
388. Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 846 F. Supp. 2d
805, 817–20 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (finding the misappropriation of trade secrets
claim was time-barred), rev’d and remanded, 521 F. App’x 453 (6th Cir.
2013).
389. Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics, LLC, 521 F. App’x 453
(6th Cir. 2013).
390. Jury Verdict at 5, Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC,
No. 2:08-cv-00390-EAS-TPK (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2008), ECF No. 246.
391. Kendall Holdings, Ltd., 2014 WL 12652324, at *2, *9.
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There appeared to be more consideration of irreparable
harm when the injunction was denied rather than granted. In
a case where the permanent injunction was denied in a written
opinion, Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co. v. Genesis
Equipment & Manufacturing, Inc.,392 the reason for the denial
was the plaintiff’s inability to prove irreparable harm.393
Interestingly, the court noted that because the plaintiff did not
move for a preliminary injunction earlier in the case, this was
evidence that weighed against a finding of irreparable harm.394
Finally, O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Monolithic Power
Systems, Inc.395 involved both patent and trade secret claims
and the lack of irreparable harm in part influenced denial of
the permanent injunction.396 The jury found misappropriation
and that it was willful.397 It awarded $12 million in unjust
enrichment damages.398 The judge reduced this amount to
$900,000 and denied the injunction in a lengthy opinion (which
was a rarity in this sample).399 The plaintiff had requested a
lead time injunction, use injunction, and production
injunction.400 The court reasoned that there would be no
production injunction because the trade secrets were not
inextricably connected to the manufacturing of the defendant’s
product.401 It denied the use injunction because the
information was no longer secret and had been disclosed.402

392. No. 4:06-CV-114, 2010 WL 3370286 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2010), aff’d,
511 F. App’x 398 (6th Cir. 2013).
393. Id. at *3.
394. Id. at *2.
395. 399 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 221 F. App’x 996 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
396. See id. at 1069–70 (concluding that the plaintiff did not suffer
significant harm due to the defendant’s misappropriation).
397. Id. at 1069.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1069–70, 1078.
400. Id. at 1069.
401. Id. at 1069–70.
402. Id. at 1070.
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V. Conclusion
This Article empirically analyzed the actual application
and use of equitable principles that guide the issuance of
permanent injunctions in trade secret cases. In particular,
attention was paid to whether eBay had influenced these cases,
expanding its reach from patent law to trade secrecy. Overall,
the study results were mixed. General equitable principles are
usually applied in the cases from the dataset, as well as in the
published cases. However, the courts do not appear to be
strictly applying the four factors from eBay.
One observation from the group of cases where prevailing
trade secret owners were awarded both damages and
permanent injunctions suggests that the property view of trade
secrets has not been abandoned and that trade secret owners
who are awarded damages are also very likely to also receive
permanent injunctions. It further suggests that the award of
monetary relief does not preclude equitable injunctive relief
and that a court could find irreparable harm even where the
loss has been compensated monetarily. A further observation
is that the injunction orders in these district court cases were
generally not very thorough, and contrary to the UTSA’s
expressed preference, did not contain a definite duration for
the injunctions. Willfulness findings and punitive damages
were often present in the cases that received permanent
injunctions. In the group of cases where the prevailing trade
secret owner received damages but not a permanent
injunction, it appears to simply have been in most of the cases,
that they did not ask. However, where injunctions were
requested but denied, the lack of irreparable harm seemed to
have been the factor most often articulated as the reason for
the denial.
Going forward, as trade secret litigation continues to
increase in federal courts, the findings from this study can
provide insights to scholars, practitioners, and the judiciary. It
is helpful, for instance, to see that while eBay is being applied
in some of the federal cases, there has not been an abrupt shift
away from the application of general equitable principles or
effective abandonment of the presumption of irreparable harm,
as in the patent cases. Thus, the property view of trade secrecy
has not been replaced by a liability view when it comes to
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assessing permanent injunctions. Nevertheless, the results do
point to the fact that overall, courts are granting permanent
injunctions sparingly in trade secret cases (perhaps as it
should be), but prevailing parties should consider being less
reticent in moving for permanent injunctions, even when they
have been awarded monetary relief.

